The problem
An agency of the United Nations has at its disposal an endowment of resources that it will distribute to various countries, with the aim of lowering their rates of infant mortality. The rate of infant survival, abbreviated RIS (one minus the rate of infant mortality), is taken to be an important indicator of the general level of physical well-being of a population, for a high rate is only achieved by good nutrition for women of child-bearing age. clean water supplies, and programs providing pre-natal care to women in the rural population.
If infant mortality is low, the factors responsible impact upon others (than infants and mothers) in the population generally. The level of a population's physical well-being is. of course, an essential ingredient of its quality of life.
When the UN agency looks at the various countries, the data that are most important to it are the rates of infant survival in each country, and the 'technology' that the country will use to convert the resources it is granted into a higher RIS. Technology must be broadly interpreted. One country may be particularly efficient at using such resources because it already has a wellorganized network of rural clinics in place. Another country might make less effective use of resources granted, not because it has a less adequate distribution system for bringing the resources to the population, but because the regime in power channels too large a fraction of the resources, from the agency's point of view, to the urban middle class, who comprise a small fraction of the population. The agency is powerless to affect this kind of political decision, in part because it is an international and not a supranational agency.
2
The technology for increasing the RIS, from the agency's viewpoint, is a function u(x), where x is the vector of resources per capita that the agency grants to the country, and u(x) is the consequent RIS achieved. Thus u(0) is the RIS before UN intervention. I take u(x) to have the usual features of a production function: it is non-decreasing in each component of x, it is continuous and concave.
If. for example, a country siphons off, and uses for another purpose, some of the resources that it is allocated to increase its RIS, then 'x' in u(x) stands for the vector of resources per capita allocated by the agency, not the vector of resources actually used effectively by the country.
The UN has no control of the siphoning: this is what it means to say that u is the technology from the UN's viewpoint.
A first pass at formulating the resource allocation problem that the agency faces is to represent the relevant information by an ordered set E = <M,n,Q,(u 1 ,N 1 ).(u 2 .N 2 ) (u r ,N r )>, where M is the budget of the agency, n is the number of resources the agency decides are relevant. Ω is the set of all ndimensional vectors of resources that the agency can purchase, at going prices, with budget M. u i is the technology the i th country uses, from the agency's viewpoint, to increase its RIS, and N i is the population of country i. Each u i is a function of the n resources, and it expresses the country's RIS as a function of the resources per capita allocated to it by the agency. There are r countries, the i tn one of which has a RIS of u'(0).
Other information, however, may be relevant to the allocation decision.
Perhaps the agency will take into consideration the various endowments of the countries, which affect their RIS, although they are not specifically
represented in E: their climates, their population densities, the degree of organization of their health services. These things appear in E only implicitly, 3 as they affect the technologies u i . Perhaps the agency should make use of its knowledge of this information directly. For example, suppose two countries have the same technologies u(x) (in particular, they have the same preintervention RIS. u(0)). and the same population size. In the case of the first country, there is a good water supply, favorable climate, and a corrupt government, which siphons resources away from their intended use. In the case of the second, there is an unfavorable climate, dirty water, but a conscientious bureaucracy, which uses the resources allocated effectively. The upshot is that the two countries have the same effective technology u. Should the UN allocate the same bundle of resources to both countries? If not, then one believes it should make use of this other information.
Represent the ancillary information, for a country i. by a set Φ i . which summarizes all kinds of political, social, geographical, and cultural information about a country, which may be relevant to decisions involving resource allocation for the purpose of raising the RIS. Ancillary information is taken to include only facts that are known to the agency. (One such fact might be that, for a certain country, the agency knows that it knows very little ancillary information.) A more complete representation of the problem the agency faces is E = <M,n,Ω. What the agency must discuss is the budget allocation rule, which will associate to every reasonable problem E that the agency might face, an allocation of resources that the agency should implement. The rule, F, thusfar unknown, can be viewed as a function that maps possible problems E into feasible allocations for those problems: using the above notation,
In fact, we can dispense with the information on the agency's budget, and consider problems of the type
The feasible set upon which the agency concentrates is the set Ω of possible resource bundles that it can purchase with its budget. The budget is only needed to determine the set Ω. From now on. it is only necessary to consider problems of the form £,.
I will propose that the agency proceed by discussing general principles that should apply to any resource allocation rule that it might adopt. This is a piecemeal approach, less ambitious that trying to come up with a complete allocation rule all at once. Deciding upon these principles can considerably narrow down the class of acceptable rules. I will propose five general principles, and particular axioms that follow from these principles. The perhaps surprising conclusion is that, haveing adopted restrictions on the class of acceptable allocation rules that are suggested by the five principles, the problem of choosing an allocation rule will have been completely solved.
Let F(£)=(x 1 x r ) specify the allocation rule; define F i (£) = x i . Thus the first country is allocated no resources. Consider the same problem, but without the first country:
That is. if a country that is allocated nothing withdraws from the problem, the allocation of resources to the other countries should not change. well as their quantities. It can be expected that the technologies of the countries will change, and their rates of infant survival will change. The 4 Indeed, the dimension of time is fabricated for this example, and may make CONRAD a less appealing axiom than it actually is. The axiom states that if the agency faces two problems that are related to each other in the manner of £. and £*, then it must allocate the x-goods in the same way in both problems --there is no presumption that the agency faces £* after it faces £. It should also be pointed out that the version of CONRAD stated here is stronger than what is actually required below for Theorem 1. CONRAD need only apply when the y-goods have a special property: that they are completely country-specific in their use, that is, that each y-good. j=n+1,m+n, is useful to only one country. Because these kinds of good hardly ever exist in practical problems, the CONRAD axiom can be viewed as a weak restriction on the behavior of resource allocation. For further discussion of CONRAD, see Roemer (1986 Roemer ( , 1987 . 5 This axiom is a very weak version of an axiom called stability in bargaining theory, introduced by Lensberg(1987 
Acceptable Allocation Rules
A resource allocation rule F is a function mapping any element £, in the domain A into a feasible allocation, it is remarkable that the seven axioms discussed above suffice to determine a unique resource allocation mechanism on the domain A, a sub-domain of problems of A defined precisely in the Appendix, available from the author. The domain is more precisely defined in the unpublished Appendix, in which the theorem is proved, where the admissible technologies are discussed.
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egalitarian distribution of the rates of infant survival; that is, F is the leximin allocation rule.
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Resources are allocated in the following way under the leximin rule. First, resources are allocated to the country with the lowest RIS until its RIS is raised to the RIS of the second lowest country. Then resources are used to raise the RISs of these two countries, until they become equal to the RIS of the third lowest country, etc. More generally, no resources are devcted to raise the RIS of a country until all countries with lower RISs have been raised either to its level, or if that is impossible, as high as they can be.
In a sense, the axioms S, MON. CONRAD, and DIC appear to be weak restrictions on the behavior of the allocation mechanism, because they each are concerned with situations that hardly ever occur. How often must the agency deal with a problem in which all the countries are identical, as postulated by S? How often must it deal with a pair of problems that are identical in their technological descriptions, except that there are more resources in one problem than in the other (MON)? (One might take the problems in consecutive years to be of this form, if the budget has increased, but. to be precise, this is not exactly the case, because the technology functions change at least slightly from year to year.) And how much of a restriction is the Deletion of Irrelevant Countries, since it hardly ever occurs that the agency faces a problem in which some country will be allocated no resources? Similarly. CONRAD refers to only a very small class of pairs of problems, which bear a certain intimate relation to each other.
It would appear that the axioms are either quite weak, in the sense of the above paragraph, or are quite reasonable, or both. The theorem therefore claims to answer definitively the policy problem of the international agency, in the remainder of the paper, I discuss how salient this model and theorem are to the practice of one international agency.
The World Health Organization (WHO)
WHO is an international organization, with 166 member countries, which is affiliated with the United Nations, although it is a juridically separate organization, its own World Healtn Assembly, which meets annually, is the supreme decision-making body. The budget of WHO comes from two sources, the first of which is the assessment of member countries. There is no attempt to form a single objective function to l0 These indicators may seem to be quite precise, but they are quite broad.
An example of a more precise health indicator, taken from a list of over 100 such, is: the percentage of children in a country whose upper-arm circumference is no less than the value corresponding to the 5th percentile of the frequency distribution for well-nourished children. This physical measurement is apparently a sensitive indicator of malnutrition. 11 There are divisions of environmental health, epidemiology, health education, communicable diseases, vector biology and control, mental health, health manpower development, noncommunicable diseases, and so on. There are programs in malaria control, parasitic diseases, aggregate the many indicators, which measure success, into one welfare measure.
As well as the program or function dimension, there is an area dimension along which the operations and budget of WHO are disaggregated. The world is divided into six regions (Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific), as well as a Global and interregional category, which handles interregional programs. Each region has a Regional Director (RD). appointed by the executive board in consultation with a regional committee. For each country, there is WHO Representative (WR), who represents the concerns of headquarters. Very briefly, the budget is negotiated as follows. First, only the regular budget --the budget from country assessments --is officially negotiated and allocated in this process. The secretariat proposes a division of the budget among the six regions and a global and interregional category. As will be seen below, this division is highly constrained by history. When the regular budget is virtually constant in real terms, as it has been during the 1980s, there is not much room for altering the division of the budget among regions from year to year. The regional allocation is followed by discussions between the regional committees of WHO and the governments in each region concerning the allocation of the regional budget among countries and among programs. Each region compiles a regional budget. Officially, the regions have control of these decisions. Countries must request specific programs. The important point is that, from an accounting point of view, the interregional division of the budget takes place immunization, diarrheal disease control, biomedical information, and so on.
first, in a centralized way, and the interprogram division is secondary and decentralized to the regional level.
In terms of our model, it is clear that the relevant units are not countries, but regions of the world: this is the level of disaggregation that is relevant for budget decision-making at WHO headquarters.
WHO has had surprisingly little discussion of the general principles that should guide budget allocation 12 . There is, however, a clearly enunciated 'feeling one's way' over the years in arriving at the allocations of WHO resources between regions (p.7)"
In Table 1 , the regular budget allocation among regions is presented for each biennial budget, beginning in 1978-9, calculated both in current prices and deflated prices, this last to make a real comparison with the previous biennial budget possible. It is important to note that only the regular budget is subject to this careful process, and the regularities that i discuss are observed only with respect to it. Note that the last period in which the regular budget increased in real terms was 1982-3.
In the budgets of that and previous periods, there is monotonicity with respect to regions. The only deviation from monotonicity is in the treatment of the Global and interregional' budget, from 1978-9 to 1980-81. when this allocation fell from $153 million to $142 million in real terms. This fall was the consequence of a World Health
Assembly decision in 1978 to cut back on the operations at neadquarters, and to direct a larger fraction of resources to country programs.
Beginning in 1984-5, the budget stagnated in real terms. In that period, when the real regular budget fell by $1.5 million, there were indeed violations of monotonicity. All regions should suffer a cut-back, according to the Monotonicity axiom, when the total budget is cut back 13 ; but only the Western Pacific and the Americas region suffered, with the brunt being borne by the Americas. Upon further investigation, however, the apparent large fall in the 13 In fact, MON states that the RIS. of no country should rise when the budget falls; throughout this discussion, however, I am taking the budget allocation to a region as the magnitude whose monotonicity is relevant. It is, of course, possible that the budget allocation to a region fall, while its R1S rises. Americas budget is due to an accounting procedure 14 . Nevertheless, some real fail must have been absorbed by the Americas region, since the total budget fell. The fall in the African real budget in 1986-7 is due to the same accounting practice. The only other violation of monotonicity occurs in 1988-9, when the European region is budgeted for a real increase, while other regions either experience no change or a slight decrease in their budgets, due to a small fall in the total real budget. But this turns out to be due to a reclassification of some 'global and interregional' programs to the European region.
WHO Regular Budget Allocations by Region by Year
Thus, the only clear violation of the monotonicity principle in these years is in the 1984-5 budget. Why does WHO seem to follow budget monotonicity in such strict fashion? From discussions with planners in the organization, it appears that this process is politically rather than ethically motivated. It would be difficult to cut the budget of any region, in an organization in which each region has political representation, and in which all regions contribute to the budget.
Although the motivation for budget monotonicity seems to be pragmatic, it is perhaps not coincidental that in many documents WHO expresses an egalitarian philosophy with regard to its project. "At present, health 14 Each region is asked to estimate the mark-up on its previous biennial allocation which is required due to changes in exchange rates alone. For the 1984-5 period, the Americas estimated a bigger mark-up than the secretariat was willing to grant. It would grant the mark-up only on the condition that the real budget allocation to the region would be proportionately reduced. Hence, the nominal allocation to the Americas was the same as it would have been with a slight increase in its real budget, had it not over-estimated the mark-up. from the secretariat's point of view. The allocation process conforms to the model in the respect that services and resources, not grants, are distributed to countries. Whether, however, resource allocation satisfies the Consistency axiom (CONRAD) is difficult to judge --again, because it is difficult to imagine situations in which the axiom might actually act as a constraint on behavior. Suppose the agency decides to allocate resources to regions in a certain way, in a problem with 10 resource.
Someone asks: if the agency faced a problem where the first five resources had already been allocated as the agency decided they should be in the 10 resource problem, should it reconsider how the remaining resources are to be allocated?
If the answer is 'no.' then resource allocation is consistent in the sense that CONRAD reauires.
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I do not claim that CONRAD must be observed. It is certainly not a requirement of 'rational ' budget planning, although planning will be 'inconsistent' without it.
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Let us suppose that there is some technology function for each region that, although unknown to the secretariat, is being maximized subject to the 16 Recall the caveat that the CONRAD axiom does not actually have a time dimension. This is for heuristic purposes only. 17 An example of an allocation rule that does not obey CONRAD is 'Equal Division Walrasian Equilibrium.' Divide the available resources among countries as they would be allocated according to the Walrasian equilibrium from equal initial endowments of the resources, where countries are assumed to take their technologies as utility functions.
While it would be difficult to claim this allocation mechanism is irrational, it is inconsistent. Suppose, for example, we begin with a problem with two resources, and we compute the equal division Walrasian equilibrium' allocation. We now fix the first resource as it has been allocated, and ask. in the new one resource problem, how will the equal division Walrasian equilibrium mechanism allocate the remaining resource? In general, the allocation will not be the same as in the original two resource problem. followed. Yet it is clear that the allocation rule is not the lexicographic egalitarian rule: for, even when there is a small increase in the total real budget, the resources allocated to all the areas are increased, while according to leximin, all the resources should be assigned to the region with the worst health status --this is perhaps Africa --until its health indicators are brought up to the level of the next worst region, perhaps South-east Asia. We can say this without knowledge of the particular technologies.
What may account for this apparent contradiction of the theorem is the domain axiom, which states that the allocation mechanism must be defined for 'all' possible problems. The planners of WHO only have to produce an allocation every two years. In the period of a generation, they will face only 12
problems.' It is not difficult to allocate budgets, for 12 problems, which obey the six 'substantive' axioms listed above, but fail to conform to the leximin allocation rule. What we can say is that it is impossible to extend the budget rule that WHO has been using to the class of all possible problems it might face, while not violating the six substantive axioms. Somewhere on the domain, the planners would be forced to violate MON or CONRAD or DIC. But this objection may seem pedantic, for the Probability is almost zero that the organization will ever be forced into a violation of an axiom in any finite number of years. Discussion of this point is pursued in Section 5C. 
A. Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism
A prominent competitor of the leximin allocation rule is the populationweighted utilitarian rule, which distributes resources among countries in that way that maximizes the popuiation-weignted sum of the regional (or country)
rates of infant survival. Indeed, it can be verified that the utilitarian rule satisfies all the axioms of Theorem 1. except MON. and because of this, our concentration on the observance of MON in the above discussion was not entireiy innocent 13 . Note that population-weighted utilitarianism would, when faced with an allocation decision between two countries of the same population, assign the larger fraction of resources to the country whose health-status would gain the most, in particular, it is well-known that utilitarianism is insensitive to the initial statuses, u i (0) it takes into account only the rates at which the health indicators would improve under resource allocation.
While in modern ethical theory utilitarianism, as applied to the allocation of goods among persons, is the subject of much criticism 19 , in the present 18 The population weighted symmetry axiom S is satisfied by populationweighted utilitarianism. If unweighted utilitarianism were the rule, the appropriate symmetry axiom would have to be unweighted symmetry, which is blind to the populations of countries. This is an indefensible axiom. 19 For example, see the essays in Sen and Williams (1982) . The tension between population-weighted utilitarianism and lexicographic egalitarianism is observable in WHO. The stated goal of allocating resources to countries in which they will be most effectively used is utilitarian; the stated concern with egalitananism suggests the leximin rule. In evaluating the achievement of various of the health indicators, stated in terms of the number of countries which have achieved certain levels, there is often a companion statement referring to the fraction of the world population that has achieved health: "It will be seen that 98 countries, representing 62% of the world (World Health Organization, 1987, pp.70,73) ."
The indicators that WHO has adopted, phrased in terms of the number of countries that have achieved specific levels of health status, are neither population-weighted utilitarian nor leximin. It will count more to lower the rates of infant mortality of several small countries over the threshold of 50 infant deaths per 1000 births than to lower the infant mortality rate of India from 100 to 80. although the second policy could save vastly more lives. By the same token, these indicators are not faithful to implementing leximin either. According to that objective, perhaps all the resources in the infant mortality program should go to Sierra Leone, whose rate of infant mortality is the highest in the world.
To maximize the number of countries whose rate of infant mortality is less than 50 per 1000, which is WHO's success indicator, one should proceed as follows.
For each country i, calculate the cost. C i , of bringing its RIS up to 950 per 1000. Arrange the countries in order of these costs, so that C i is the lowest cost. Let M be the budget and let j be the largest integer such that ZJCi<. M. Then the budget should be spent entirely on countries 1 thourgh j, to bring their rates of infant survival up to 950 per 1000. This procedure, in particular, would usually require not giving any resources to the worst off countries, so it is antithetical to leximin. On the other hand, it will tend to discriminate against large countries, because, other things being equal, they will require more resources to raise them up to the required rate--so it is quite distant from population-weighted utilitarianism. It is closest to an 'unweighted country utilitarianism.' in the following sense. country i has a rate of infant mortality of 50 or less, and v l (x) = 0 otherwise.
Then maximizing the number of countries whose rates of infant mortality are 50 or less is equivalent to distributing resources to maximize £v l (xi). i will therefore call the policy that follows from this procedure 'modified unweighted country utilitarianism.'
I asked planners at WHO to what extent the secretariat was guided by trying to maximize the numbers of countries' indicators, and was told that these were rules of thumb, but were not observed when their maximization clearly involved ignoring the severe problems of large countries. I was told that the indices were indicators,' not 'objectives.' Still, in a large and complex organization, where workers in bureaus at the lower levels may take seriously the precise indicators of performance set by higher authorities, it may be the case that such indicators guide policy more literally than is intended.
There have been some examples in the recent history of WHO where resource allocation has been guided by unmodified unweighted country utilitarianism, but these examples seem to be isolated cases. Several years ago, it was decided to allocate a more-than-usual amount of resources to certain countries--one was Sri Lanka --which were judged to be able to show fast and dramatic results.
This move was a political one, whose intent was to demonstrate the potential impact of WHO programs. Apparently, the policy was quickly discontinued, Although the WHO allocation is just a tiny fraction of the health budget for each country, its importance is understated by this figure, because of the organizational nature of the service that it provides.
This suggests that the model 1 have studied may be seriously misspecified.
It may be more accurate to model the WHO problem as the allocation of resources to most effectively change the technologies that the countries face.
Let U be the class of all possible technologies. We can represent the technology of technical change by a mapping 7:wXn--J, where R+ is the set of positive real.
numbers, interoreted as follows: T(u.y)=v means that expending y dollars can transform technology u into techology v. Suppose that 'conventional' resources, such as vaccines, are available in amount x. Then the provision of 'technical assistance' in amount y by WHO has the effect of changing the RIS from u(x) to T(u,y)(x)=v(x). If we fix u, as it is fixed in a country, and recall that the set of available resources is Ω. then T(u,y)(x) can be viewed as a mapping t u from ΩxR + into R + : T(u,y)(x)=t u (x,y). It may be appropriate to assume that t u is convex and increasing in y and concave and increasing in x.22 The convexity in y follows from the fact that investment in the development of infrastructure is best viewed as one of increasing returns to scale. The better the infrastructure is, the less costly it is to improve the 'tecnnology' for transforming resources into a rate of infant survival. The function t u is concave in x, for with fixed y, t u is just a normal 'technology.'
22 By increasing in y, I mean that if T(u.y)=v and T(u.y')=V, for y'>y, then for all x, v'(x>v(x). The analysis of problems of the type ε will not be carried out here, Even if the other axioms are followed by WHO in its resource allocation procedure, the domain axiom is not compelling, in the sense that the organization need only worry about efficiency, fairness, consistency, and so on, for a very small number of problems. Theorem 1 tells us that it is impossible to extend the resource allocation decisions that WHO has made over the past decade to a procedure which would be defined for every possible problem in the domain A, without violating at least one of the six substantive axioms. But is this not a foolish consistency to ask for?
The theory of resource allocation that I have presented depends, as do much of social choice theory and bargaining theory more generally, on the requirement that the allocation rule be defined for a large domain of possible problems.
This axiom, in many circumstances, is justified not by the claim that, in the application at hand, all possible problems in the domain will eventually be encountered, but rather by the fact that one does not know beforehand which problems will be encountered, and so the allocation rule must be specified for all problems. But in WHO, and doubtless in most organizations, the allocation rule is not written down; the agency has the freedom to choose the allocation after the problem has been specified. With a history of a finite number of solved problems, it is almost always the case that when a new problem is introduced, the agency will have a great deal of latitude in proposing a solution for it, while not violating the substantive axioms that embody the agency's principles of resource allocation, within the set of problems that comprise recent history.
It is this difference in procedure, I think, that renders the formal theory of allocation mechanisms largely irrelevant for the study of practical policy.
The domain axiom of the theory is most easily justified by the requirement --an unstated axiom --that the choice of mechanism must precede the specification of problems that are to be solved, In the real world, organizations have the freedom to specify the allocation after the problems are encountered. The use of mechanism theory to describe what resource-allocating agencies do must therefore be severely circumscribed.
My ambivalent thoughts are best phrased as a pair of questions: If WHO decides that it either should (e.g., consistency) or must (e.g., monotonicity) follow the substantive axioms, then, knowing that it will only encounter a small number of 'problems,' should it nevertheless follow a leximin policy?
(Alternatively, an axiomatic characterization of population-weighted utilitarianism could be derived, and a similar question posed.) Or should the planners feel that they are following the spirit of the general principles, even if the leximin rule is not followed, knowing that they can in ail likelihood avoid any overt axiom violation for the forseeable future? As a normative tool, at least, I think the axiomatic analysis is useful. Planners can perhaps gain insight about contrasting policies by understanding the axioms (such as Monotonicity) that distinguish them.
